

ROUTING

Top Secret 217

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Friday January 28, 1977

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday January 28, 1977.

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

SPAIN-USSR: Diplomatic Relations

Page 2

USSR - NORTH KOREA: Pak's Visit

Page 5

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Deporting Dissidents

Page 6

SOUTH AFRICA: Uranium Enrichment Plant

Page 8

PHILIPPINES: Base Negotiations

Page 10

25X1

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SPAIN-USSR: Diplomatic Relations

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[redacted] Spain and the USSR probably will announce establishment of diplomatic relations [redacted]

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[redacted] Apparently Spain's progress toward democratic reform under Prime Minister Suarez and its recent toleration of the activity of Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo and other party members have provided the Soviets with justification to make a move now they have desired for some time.

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[redacted] Each country already has a trade mission in the other's capital. Among problems still to be worked out is Spanish concern that the Soviet mission is too large.

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[redacted] During the past week, Spain established in rapid succession relations with Romania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, which already have commercial and consular relations.

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[redacted] Romania and Spain were ready to announce diplomatic relations last May, but the Romanians called off the announcement, possibly under pressure from the Soviets and Santiago Carrillo. [redacted]

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USSR - NORTH KOREA: Pak's Visit

North Korean Premier Pak Song-chol got the full protocol treatment during his two-day "friendship" visit to Moscow earlier this week, but the resulting rhetoric suggests that the USSR remains niggardly about providing North Korea with the increased political, economic, and military support it seeks.

At the dinner speeches during the visit, Premier Kosygin reiterated Soviet support for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea and for speeding the "peaceful reunification" of the country but said nothing about North Korea's recent proposal for North-South talks or about North Korea's claim to be the only legitimate Korean government.

A terse press release issued at the end of the visit indicated only that the two sides had discussed ways to expand economic and trade relations and other bilateral and international questions of mutual concern.

//The visit by the North Korean Premier was the first of its kind since Foreign Minister Ho Tam's visit to Moscow in 1972, but there is evidence that it is not the visit the North Koreans were seeking. President Kim Il-song apparently has been angling for a summit with Soviet leaders to balance his highly publicized trip to Peking in April 1975, and the Soviets, mindful of their relations with the US, have been putting him off. Tentative Soviet plans to receive Kim in late 1976 were apparently scuttled after the Panmunjom incident last August because of Moscow's desire not to be associated in US eyes with that event.//

//From the Korean point of view, a primary purpose of the visit was doubtless to persuade Moscow to increase its military and economic aid. Soviet aid to North Korea has declined markedly since 1973. Included in the North Korean delegation was a high-ranking military officer who wrote an article last summer that emphasized the need for "outside support and aid" to achieve success in modern warfare.//

//No Soviet military personnel were identified as taking part in the talks and we doubt that much new military aid was provided. The Soviets are probably aware that North

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Korea's armed forces already have a quantitative weapons advantage over those of the South and thus see no compelling need to provide Pyongyang with additional sophisticated equipment.//

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[] //Talks about economic and trade relations may have been somewhat more productive, but it is doubtful that the USSR offered North Korea any hard currency to help Pyongyang with its current debt problem. As one Soviet official said last year, the USSR was not consulted when North Korea made its commitments, and it is not responsible for them now.// []

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Deporting Dissidents

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[] Speculation reportedly is increasing in Prague that the regime may try to deport some of the most prominent dissidents who launched the Charter 77 human rights manifesto. A new media campaign appears to be urging that the dissidents be "sent to their capitalist friends and breadgivers."

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[] The Czechoslovak ambassador in Vienna on Tuesday asked for and received confirmation of an Austrian offer of asylum for the dissidents. Prague's envoy reportedly produced a list of eight names, including playwrights Vaclav Havel and Pavel Kohout, former foreign minister Jiri Hajek, journalist Jiri Lederer, writer Ludvik Vaculik and three others who held high Communist Party posts under Dubcek prior to the 1968 invasion--Frantisek Kriegel, Milan Huebl, and Zdenek Mlynar.

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[] Of the almost 300 persons who signed the Charter 77 manifesto, some 200 reportedly have been harassed, including the principal authors, who have been detained by the police. Dissident sources in Prague reportedly say it is unlikely that any of those concerned would leave Czechoslovakia voluntarily. One of the leaders in the Charter 77 affair, playwright Kohout, yesterday said he would remain. He called on the government to deal with the charter signatories by "political means" and appealed to all foreign governments with an interest in human rights to offer to mediate the dispute. []

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SOUTH AFRICA: Uranium Enrichment Plant

25X1 [] //South Africa has completed a pilot uranium-en-
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now operating and approaching full capacity, after more than a
year of technical difficulties.//

25X1 [] //South African statements about the effectiveness
of the secret enrichment process being used are not reliable
because it is unclear whether they reflect the actual technology
of the new plant or are instead reflections of South African ex-
pectations of future plant performance.//

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less effective than the South African claims would indicate. It was built with emphasis on ease of construction and minimal foreign involvement, using unsophisticated technology and materials

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
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//South Africa plans to build a second enrichment plant with a much larger capacity, to be operational in the mid-1980s, and is seeking foreign investment and more advanced technology for this project. If these plans are realized, South Africa will be able to perform up to 10 percent of reactor-grade uranium enrichment in the non-Communist world by the mid-to-late 1980s.


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


PHILIPPINES: Base Negotiations

[REDACTED] //Philippine President Marcos' recent public warnings that his government could decide to terminate the arrangement for US military bases have aroused concern among important groups in the Philippines.//

[REDACTED] //Most observers in the Philippines assume that Marcos is only trying to get the new US administration to give early attention to the recessed negotiations on the bases. They are concerned, however, that he might find it preferable to abandon the bases agreement rather than suffer a loss of prestige from accepting terms significantly short of his public demands.//






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[REDACTED] // Marcos cannot easily ignore such influential opinion, but he appears to be increasingly insulated from outside influences by his staff. Some staff members seem to be nudging him toward a hardline position arguing that, to protect its strategic interests, the US will ultimately have to agree to Marcos' terms. [REDACTED]

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